The role of market power in economic growth: an analysis of the differences between EU and US competition policy theory, practice and outcomes by Ciriani, Stephane & Lebourges, Marc
European Journal of Government and Economics 
Volume 5, Number 1 (June 2016) 
ISSN: 2254-7088 
5 
 
The role of market power in economic growth: 
an analysis of the differences between EU and 
US competition policy theory, practice and 
outcomes 
Stephane Ciriani, Orange  
Marc Lebourges, Orange 
 
Abstract  
The European Union has experienced weak economic performance over the past 
15 years, compared to the United States. In order to restore investment, 
innovation, and therefore growth, the European Commission seeks to raise the 
level of static competition in all markets. The Commission’s economic policy is 
largely determined by its competition policy. This policy is derived from its doctrine 
on competition law, which regards the exercise of market power as a source of 
inefficiency and advocates that its effects should be banned. By contrast, the 
United States competition authorities, under the influence of the Chicago School, 
consider that market power is a necessary incentive to invest and a fair return on 
investment. Recent findings in economic growth theory, which state that increased 
competition intensity may harm endogenous innovation, provide a theoretical basis 
to support the United States approach and call for a review of European doctrine.    
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Economic growth in the European Union (EU) over the past fifteen years has been 
weak by international standards, and the pace of recovery from the financial crisis 
is slow. The economy of the EU has started to lose ground against the United 
States (US) since the mid-1990s. The European Commission has acknowledged 
that the weak economic performance of the EU is notably due to low investment in 
new technologies, and pointed at the need to increase the innovation effort in order 
to foster economic growth in the EU and to compete on a global scale. The 
economic policy of the European Commission is largely influenced by the 
principles and actions of the European competition authorities. The Commission’s 
economic doctrine posits that the ever-increasing level of competition intensity 
invariably leads to higher investment in innovation, and that competition policy is a 
major instrument to foster economic growth. The core principle of the European 
competition policy is that market power, although not considered unlawful, is the 
main source of economic inefficiency, and its effects should therefore be removed.  
An analysis of the principles and the effects of this economic doctrine is proposed, 
in order to examine whether the Commission’s policy is the most appropriate to 
reverse the structural trends of investment and productivity in the EU. The first 
section describes European Commission’s economic doctrine and its views on the 
role and the effects of competition policy, on the basis of reports and 
communications published by the European authorities. This section shows that 
the European Commission applies its competition policy in order to increase the 
level of static competition intensity in all markets (i.e. to eliminate all the effects of 
the exercise of market power), with the objective to promote aggregate investment 
in equipment, technology and innovation.  
The second section provides a comparative analysis of the principles and the 
practices of the competition courts and agencies in the US and the EU. It highlights 
the differences between the US and the European authorities over the purpose of 
competition law and over the way authorities address market power. The European 
competition doctrine attempts to prevent the emergence and to ban the exercise of 
market power, market power being considered as a factor of inefficiency per se. By 
contrast, the US authorities tend to encourage the effects of market power, after 
their doctrine experienced an in-depth review in the 1970s, led by the Chicago 
School of economics.  
The third section presents recent findings in the fields of economic growth theory 
and innovation economics, which show that market power is both a necessary 
incentive and a fair return on investment and that a systematic increase in the level 
of static competition might end up discouraging endogenous innovation. 
A fourth section provides an assessment of the consistency of the European and 
the US doctrine on competition law and competition policy with these recent 
results. It concludes that the European Commission should review and update its 
doctrine in order to promote robust and sustainable economic growth in the EU.         
1. The European Commission’s doctrine on the role 
and effects of competition policy  
This first section describes the European Commission’s economic doctrine on the 
nature of competition, the concept of market power, and the role of competition 
policy as the main engine of economic growth. This economic doctrine is made 
visible and explicit through a set of quotes extracted from a body of documents 
published by various European Commission entities over the last ten years. The 
analysis of these quotes helps formalise the core principles of the Commission’s 
economic doctrine, which underlies its competition policy. This analysis also 
demonstrates how the Commission applies these principles in order to tackle 
European weaknesses in terms of investment in technology and innovation and to 
meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, whereby the Commission notably 
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commits to ‘develop an economy based on knowledge and innovation’, and to 
promote a ‘more competitive economy’. This section provides evidence that in 
order to stimulate aggregate investment, the European Commission aims to 
increase the level of static competition in all markets, based on the doctrine that 
more intense competition invariably leads to higher rates of innovation and 
increased productivity. In the rest of this article, the term ‘market power’ refers to 
‘the ability to set price above marginal cost’ as defined by Landes and Posner 
(1981), who state that if ‘a firm’s price is above its marginal cost, the implication is 
that the firm does not face perfect competition, i.e., that it has at least some market 
power’.   
1.1.  Competition policy is the core of the European 
Commission’s economic doctrine  
In its most recent Report on Competition Policy, the European Commission 
(2015a) outlines a primary objective of its competition policy, which consists in 
being ‘vigilant that manufacturers of important input products do not acquire the 
power to raise prices above competitive levels through mergers’. The European 
Commission (2012) advocates competition as the main driver of economic growth 
and regards competition policy as the main instrument to support productivity and 
competitiveness. Competition is viewed as ‘the most important single driver of 
innovation, competitiveness and therefore growth’, while ‘competition policy can 
create the conditions for growth and employment across Europe’. Moreover, 
‘promoting strong competition enforcement in Europe -at every level- is a powerful 
energiser for the economy because its effects can be immediate’.  
The European Parliament (2015) recently recalled that competition policy remains 
at the core of the economic policy of the EU-28. It stated that ‘for a long time, 
competition policy has been providing a prevailing conceptual model influencing 
policy developments at EU level, which is still at work nowadays’, and that ‘there is 
actually little call for a radical overhaul in this respect’. The European Commission 
(2012a) considers that competition always drives economic growth and maximises 
social welfare, as ‘competition enforcement and advocacy serve wider long-term 
objectives such as enhancing consumer welfare, supporting the EU’s growth, jobs 
and competitiveness in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’.  
The Commission (2004a) has identified competition as the major policy instrument 
to foster economic growth, stating that ‘vigorous competition is a key driver for 
competitiveness and economic growth’, which ‘generates pressures on firms to 
innovate and (…) improve their cost structure and reap productivity gains.’ 
Competition is regarded as a ‘continuous structural adaptation process’ and ‘a vital 
market process which rewards firms offering lower prices, better quality, new 
products, and greater choice’. For the Commission, competition is an evolutionary 
process that selects the most efficient firms: ‘competition leads to the introduction 
of improved products and processes, weeding out inefficient firms and reallocating 
productive resources from retreating firms to new entrants or more efficient 
competitors’. Competition separates efficient firms from inefficient ones and 
reallocates inputs and financial resources to the most efficient activities. By doing 
so, the most productive sectors are endowed with greater resources at a lower 
price, allowing them to invest in private fixed assets.  
A crucial argument raised by the European Commission in favour of its competition 
policy is that it reallocates resources from inefficient sectors to the most productive 
ones. This process generates productivity gains and spreads them across sectors. 
The Commission (2011a) aims to support ‘structural change towards dynamic 
sectors and high-productivity activities’, through the reallocation of production 
factors and financial capital from ‘slow-growing to dynamic firms and sectors’, and 
from ‘non-tradable to tradable sector’, hence, from services to industrial sectors. 
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This reallocation depends on the ‘strict implementation of competition policies at 
both EU and national level’. The cross-sector reallocation of these productive 
resources depends on markets’ ability to give investors ‘adequate price signals’. 
Since price signals are fully accurate only under perfect competition, the productive 
inputs will move towards the most efficient and productive sectors provided that the 
markets actually tend towards perfect competition. A fall in the price of intermediate 
inputs which are produced by service sectors should result from a convergence of 
markets towards their perfectly competitive frame.  
1.2.  For the European Commission, macroeconomic 
performance depends on the control of markets by the 
competition authorities    
According to the European Parliament (2013), the instruments of competition policy 
(antitrust, merger control, State aid and ex-ante regulation of specific sectors) 
promote ‘growth drivers such as productivity, innovation, investment and low 
prices’. Following this rationale, the competition policy enforced by the 
Commission’s agencies is assumed to achieve static efficiency through price 
competition that leads to equating prices and marginal costs, simultaneously 
generating dynamic efficiencies by fostering innovation through an evolutionary 
process of rivalry.  
The European authorities believe that in order for competition to fully deliver its 
growth-enhancing effect, markets have to be organised by competition authorities. 
The European Commission (2011a) recommends to strengthen ‘the administrative 
capacity of the competition authority.’ The policy priority to ‘create a business-
friendly environment conducive to improving the economy’s competitiveness’ has 
to be achieved through the ‘efficient functioning of competition authorities, market 
regulators and judicial authorities’. The European Commission (2015a) outlines 
that technological progress stems directly from innovation and that a strict 
enforcement of antitrust law is the primary condition to stimulate innovation: 
‘vibrant competition is essential to stimulate innovation and spread the benefits of 
technological development among Europe’s citizens’, and ‘effective enforcement of 
antitrust and merger policy makes it easier for small businesses to thrive and gain 
access to markets in sectors dominated by network effects’.              
1.3.  The Commission acknowledges that the European Union 
has been losing ground in terms of competitiveness because of 
low investment in innovation even prior to the financial crisis 
The European Commission (2015b) acknowledges that ‘productivity growth 
remains slow’ in the EU, ‘affecting competitiveness and living standards’, and that 
the recovery from the post-crisis recession remains moderate. According to Van 
Ark and Erumban (2015), the EU has had a slower productivity growth rate than 
the US since the early 1990s, which was largely due to a slower pace of innovation 
and technology adoption, mainly in the services sector. The Commission 
acknowledges that the economic weaknesses of the EU might be related to 
structural inefficiencies rather than being just the outcome of the financial crisis 
which broke out in 2008.  
The European Commission (2010a) indicates that ‘even before the crisis, there 
were areas where Europe was not progressing fast enough relative to the rest of 
the world’, and that ‘Europe’s average growth rate has been structurally lower than 
[its] main economic partners, largely due to a productivity gap that has widened 
over the last decade’. This productivity gap is notably due to ‘lower levels of 
investment in R&D and innovation’, and ‘insufficient use of information and 
communications technologies’.       
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The European Commission (2013a) has more recently pointed at the structural 
weaknesses of the European economy, notably, slow productivity growth and a 
lack of contribution of information and communications technologies (ICT) to 
aggregate productivity growth. The Commission (2004b) also expressed concerns 
about the labour productivity slowdown in the Union and the widening gap with the 
US over 1995-2004, especially in high-technology sectors. The Commission 
(2004b) showed that growth in European high-technology sectors’ productivity had 
been stronger than that of the overall economy of the EU, but lower than that of 
their US counterparts. The EU has experienced a slowdown in the productivity of 
its manufacturing industries and also of its high-technology sectors such as the 
digital industries. Moreover, Gorning and Schiersch (2014) find that the EU in 
general and the Euro Area in particular had a lower level of investment than the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average during 
1999-2007. The Commission (2009a) warned that the ‘potential GDP of the 
European Union could fall to a permanently lower trajectory’, as ‘the stock of 
equipment and infrastructure will decrease and become obsolete due to lower 
investment’.  
1.4.  The European Commission acknowledges the crucial role 
of investment in economic growth    
The European Commission (2012b) acknowledges that investment is the driving 
force behind economic growth. It points to the need to keep up with the pace of 
technological progress in order for European firms to compete on a global scale: 
‘new investment is now urgently needed to stimulate economic recovery and bring 
innovation and new technologies back onto factory floors. If Europe does not keep 
up with investment in the adoption and diffusion of these technologies, its future 
competitiveness will be seriously compromised’. The Commission (2014a) insists 
on the need to increase investment in all sectors of the economy, especially in 
equipment, in order to improve the competitiveness of the EU. The Commission 
(2014b) reaffirms that investment to restore potential growth is a key policy priority 
and that the slow accumulation of fixed capital has hampered productivity and 
growth in the Union over 2007-2014. The Commission (2014c) also acknowledges 
that strong contraction of investment since 2008 is one of the primary reasons for 
the weakness of the recovery and that persistently low investment deteriorates 
potential growth.  
1.5.  The Commission acknowledges that private investment 
can be harmed by weak profitability and that expected 
profitability influences investment  
The European Commission acknowledges that firms have to restore profitability to 
sustain investment. The Commission (2013b) indicates that ‘the German case in 
the 2000s illustrates how restoration of profit margins may also have contributed to 
fostering investment and the possible link between profit margins and investment 
and innovation’. The Commission (2012c) acknowledged that sufficient profitability 
is required to finance investment: a ‘reduction in the profitability of French firms, 
which reached historically low levels in 2011, weighs on their investment potential 
as well as their innovation capacity to the detriment of their non-cost 
competitiveness’. The Commission (2013b) indicates that ‘the disappointing 
evolution of firms’ profitability is particularly alarming because it may prevent firms 
from raising their investment in equipment, R&D, marketing, brand’. The 
Commission also acknowledges that expected profitability drives investment 
forward. It relies upon Jorgenson (1963) who links investment to expected 
profitability and Tobin (1969) who notes that investment decisions depend on the 
expected value of future profits. Moreover, Herbet (2001) shows that restoring 
profit margins might have encouraged investment in the main developed countries 
in the 1990s. The Commission (2011a) acknowledges the link between investment 
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decisions and expected profitability: ‘Expectations of higher growth will contribute 
to restoring confidence and stability on financial markets. With improved prospects, 
businesses will start to invest again’. The Commission recognises both the need 
for profit margins to finance current investments and the need for sufficient 
expected returns to plan future investments. 
1.6.  To support private investment, the Commission 
recommends fostering competition in order to tackle low 
profitability by reducing input costs  
In 2008, the European Commission expressed its commitment to a strong 
application of competition rules during the financial crisis, based on the view that 
‘competition enforcement strengthens the economy, even - perhaps particularly - in 
times of difficulty’. More recently, the Commission (2015b) indicated that 
competition has to be strengthened in order to encourage investment and efficient 
allocation of resources, through eased market entry and lower prices of services. 
For the Commission (2015c), a trade-off between competition and innovation is not 
empirically relevant, and competition succeeds ‘in fostering productivity thanks to 
higher investments, better managerial organisation and innovation’.  
In addition, the  Commission (2013c) recommends to increase competition in the 
markets of intermediate inputs in order to raise industrial investment. Business 
services are essential inputs for the manufacturing sector and represent an 
important share of production costs. For the Commission, business services 
(including network industries) are sheltered from international competition while 
industrial sectors are exposed to foreign competitors. Opening sheltered business 
services to competition would then lower the cost of services used as inputs by 
exporting industry sectors.  
The European Commission (2014d) affirms that increased competition intensity in 
these sheltered intermediary markets could contribute to lowering services’ costs, 
hence improving competitiveness of the economy. It posits that ‘low levels of 
competition in services translate into higher intermediary costs for firms and less 
innovative services’, and as a result, ‘further stimulating competition both in the 
product and services sectors would benefit exporting firms and contribute to their 
competitiveness’.  
The Commission (2013c) posits that with lower factor costs, firms will restore their 
profit margins and their investment capacities. Lower production costs due to 
greater competition also ‘strengthen entrepreneurs’ expectations due to improved 
competitiveness that has translated into the recovery in investment’. The other 
priority to restore investment is to overcome firms’ insufficient access of to external 
sources of funding, through the capital increase of the European Investment Bank, 
the allocation of structural funds and the implementation of the European 
Commission’s Action Plan on Access to Finance for Small and Medium businesses 
(2011b). In the opinion of the Commission, firms with insufficient profit margins are 
supposed to overcome the shrinkage of their internal resources by turning to 
external (and notably public) funding sources to finance their investments.  
1.7.  For the European Commission, dynamic efficiencies 
arise directly from static efficiency   
The European Commission promotes static competition, and aims to achieve static 
efficiency, a state where firms are not able to set their price above their marginal 
costs of production and make no profit. In this perfectly competitive frame, price-
cost margins are eliminated, and all the effects of market power are removed. The 
European competition policy strives to eliminate the effects of market power at the 
level of upstream markets by lowering the intermediate inputs’ and capital goods’ 
prices, which in turn reduces production costs and leads to lower prices in the 
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downstream markets. In addition, the Commission affirms that investment depends 
upon the wide availability of low-cost production factors, and expects investment to 
arise from intense static competition. The Commission considers that dynamic 
efficiencies arise directly from static efficiency. In the Commission’s view, the 
resources needed to finance investment do not accrue from expected profit 
margins as fair return on investment, but from a greater availability of low-cost 
inputs. This greater availability stems from increased static competition in the 
intermediate input markets. Competition is either viewed as a steady state of static 
efficiency (where prices equal marginal costs) or an evolutionary process 
generating dynamic efficiencies. The Commission considers that investment arises 
exogenously from high levels of static competition. The Commission does not 
address the fact that the producers of intermediate inputs and capital goods might 
be discouraged to invest because of either insufficient funding resources or 
insufficient profit prospects.  
2. The differences between the European and the US 
doctrine on competition law and practice of 
competition policy    
This section describes the differences between the US and the European practices 
of competition policy, and explains how these differences can influence economic 
outcomes. The differences in the practices of competition policy relate to different 
doctrines on the objectives of competition law, the effects of market power on 
economic performance and the autonomy of dominant firms in setting their 
commercial and industrial strategies. The European competition policy strives to 
tackle all the effects of market power. By contrast, the US competition authorities, 
under the influence of the Chicago School, regard market power as a necessary 
condition to foster private investment, and do not consider the exercise of market 
power as inefficient. In practice, the US authorities intend to maintain the incentives 
of firms to invest in order to gain market power, whereas in the EU, the competition 
authorities consider that the effects of market power need to be eliminated.  
2.1. The European competition authorities monitor markets in 
order to ban market power effects   
The European competition authorities are empowered to monitor markets to 
ensure they reach their highest level of static competition. The European 
Commission (2009b) considers that a firm which is able to ‘profitably increase 
prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time’ does not ‘face 
sufficiently effective competitive constraints and can thus generally be regarded as 
dominant’. The Commission considers that ‘persistently high market shares may be 
indicative of the existence of barriers to entry and expansion’. Consequently, it 
considers that ‘the stronger the dominant position, the higher the likelihood that 
conducts protecting that position leads to anticompetitive foreclosure’.  
The practical elements of competition policy relating to concentrations are defined 
in the Guidelines on the assessment of mergers. In the Guidelines on the 
assessment of horizontal mergers, the European Commission (2004) explains that 
it must assess ‘whether or not a concentration would significantly impede effective 
competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position’. According to these Guidelines, the Commission must ‘take into account 
any significant impediment to effective competition likely to be caused by a 
concentration. The creation or the strengthening of a dominant position is a primary 
form of such competitive harm’. Market shares are the indicator of static 
competition intensity: the European Commission (2004) indicates that ‘the larger 
the market share, the more likely a firm is to possess market power. And the larger 
the addition of market share, the more likely it is that a merger will lead to a 
significant increase in market power’. The Commission notes that threats on 
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effective competition do arise when ‘the merged entity has a significant degree of 
market power (which does not necessarily amount to dominance) in at least one of 
the markets concerned’.  
2.2. The appraisal of market power by the European competition 
authorities might hamper the incentives of private firms to 
invest and innovate  
As explained by Fox (1997), the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice ‘readily presume dominance and increases in dominance without the kind 
of factual records that might be required in the United States.’ The European 
competition law considers that a dominant firm is responsible for the competitive 
structure of the market. According to Marty and Pillot (2010), European competition 
law assigns the dominant firm a ‘responsibility for competition’. The authors argue 
that the application of the doctrine of essential facilities to intangible assets like 
intellectual property has limited the strategic options of dominant firms.  According 
to Lang (1979), in the case of United Brands in 1978, the European Court of 
Justice defined dominant position as the ability of a firm to prevent effective 
competition being maintained ‘even if that power has not been exercised and so 
effective competition has not been ended’. For Marty and Pillot (2010), the 1979 
Hoffman-Laroche judgment shows that the European competition authorities act to 
limit the market dominance of a firm because market power is regarded as a 
distortion of the competitive market structure. Therefore, competition authorities 
can sanction an abuse of dominant position on the basis of anticompetitive 
behaviour rather than on the basis of actual anticompetitive effects. Marty (2012) 
indicates that the 2003 decision of the Court of Justice (Michelin II) further 
confirmed that a dominant firm can be sanctioned because its behaviour might 
undermine competition, and not necessarily because of its actual anti-competitive 
effects. Marty (2012) also argues that, in the case of TeliaSonera’s abuse of 
dominant position in 2011, the European Court of Justice reaffirmed the liability of 
the dominant firm to maintain ‘effective’ competition. Marty (2012) argues that the 
2011 judgment provides further confirmation of the European Court of Justice’s 
2007 statement on France Telecom: ‘showing an anticompetitive object and an 
anticompetitive effect may, in some cases, be one and the same thing. If it is 
shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant 
position is to restrict competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an 
effect’. If a dominant firm is shown to intend to distort competition, the European 
competition authorities can sanction it as an abuse of dominant position, even in 
the absence of anti-competitive effects. 
2.3. The influence of the Chicago School of antitrust has 
reoriented the US practice of competition law towards the 
promotion of economic efficiency 
The doctrine underlying the practice of competition law in the US experienced a 
major revision in the early 1970s, which, under the influence of the Chicago School 
of antitrust, led to a more flexible approach to market concentration and the 
behaviour of dominant firms. Prior to this revision, between 1940 and 1970, US 
competition law was influenced by the ‘structuralist’ approach developed by the 
Harvard School of economics, which considered that concentrated market 
structures led to anticompetitive behaviour and harmed economic welfare. During 
this period, the US competition authorities widely applied per se rules, according to 
which numerous practices of dominant firms where considered illegal per se, 
independently of their actual effects on the markets. This emphasis on market 
structures and per se rules led the US courts and competition agencies to broaden 
the range of conducts likely to be sanctioned, and to apply a strict antitrust policy.  
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For Kovacic (2007), ‘the courts defined the concept of wrongful behaviour so 
broadly that a wide range of conducts sufficed to create liability for dominant firms’, 
and ‘judicial decisions adopted an exceptionally expansive view of abuse’. The 
revision of the US doctrine on antitrust law which occurred by the early 1970s was 
inspired by the Chicago School’s critical views regarding Per Se rules and their 
advocacy for economic efficiency ‘as the exclusive basis for the design and 
application of antitrust rules’, as noted by Kovacic (2007).  
In addition, Marty (2010) mentions that in the opinion of the Chicago School, the 
aims of firms cannot be regarded as a proof of anticompetitive conduct, and that 
anticompetitive behaviour needs to be sanctioned on the basis of its actual effects 
on the market and on the basis of its impact on economic efficiency, rather than on 
the basis of its potential effects. For Piraino (2007), the approach of the Chicago 
School was adopted by the US courts and agencies in order to ‘redress the harsh 
approach of the Harvard School, which often invalidated conduct that had the 
potential to enhance firms' efficiency and thereby benefit consumers’.  
For Kovacic and Shapiro (2000), this adoption was motivated by the observations 
that US firms were losing competitiveness both on foreign markets and in the 
domestic market, and the idea that their declining performances might be induced 
by an excessive enforcement of antitrust policy. They explain that the Chicago 
School claimed that conduct such as vertical restraints were ‘often benign or pro-
competitive’ and that ‘many phenomena, including industrial concentration, 
mergers, and contractual restraints’ were sources of economic efficiency and 
should be allowed by the US courts and competition agencies. As a result, the US 
courts gave ‘dominant firms considerable freedom to choose pricing, product 
development and promotional strategies’. For Kovacic (2007) the trend of US 
antitrust doctrine over the past thirty years ‘has been to give dominant firms greater 
freedom to select pricing, product development, and distribution strategies’, and 
‘the progression toward greater doctrinal permissiveness has not been unbroken’. 
2.4. The US doctrine on competition law regards market power 
as a source of economic performance and vertical integration as 
a potential source of efficiency      
Two key contributions of the Chicago School to the practice of US competition law 
relate to the appreciation of market power and the assessment of vertical 
relationships. The Chicago School considers that market power reflects the ability 
of firms to improve their performance and that sanctioning firms which acquired 
monopoly power might discourage them from competing intensively in order to 
provide consumers with higher quality products. According to Marty (2010), the US 
competition authorities have considered since the 1970s that the exploitation of a 
dominant position is lawful and justified because it allows invested capital to be 
recouped and is a fair return on a risky investment. Moreover, market power is an 
incentive for competitors to enter the market, and as such should not be 
sanctioned by the authorities. For Marty (2010), the Chicago School posits that a 
firm which acquire market power and extract an economic rent will increase social 
welfare in the short run. In the long run, its dominance will be challenged by new 
competitors, based on a self-correcting process inherent in the market.  
As mentioned by Porter (2002), market power (prices above the marginal costs of 
production) allows for improvements in the quality of products, and ‘high-value 
products provide the consumer with superior performance and features, and 
therefore justify higher prices’. Porter (2002) argues that higher prices should only 
be a concern for competition authorities if they are not justified by increased value 
for consumers, and claims that ‘firm profitability is a good thing if it reflects truly 
superior products or significant advantages in process technology or operating 
efficiency’, and that ‘it is a bad thing if it occurs in the absence of a healthy rate of 
dynamic improvement’. Therefore, antitrust authorities that strive to ‘limit short term 
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price/cost margins or profitability’ might underestimate the value brought to the 
consumer by dynamic competition and the related efficiency improvement. The 
measure of consumer welfare would then be affected by a downward bias and lead 
to decisions that are detrimental to consumers.  
According to Riordan (2005) the Chicago School posits that vertical integration 
increases economic efficiency and rejects the structuralist view that it induces 
anticompetitive behaviour such as exclusionary practices and the ‘leverage of 
monopoly power from one market to another’. Rey and Tirole (2007) explain that 
the Chicago School, led by the works of Bork (1978) and Posner (1976), 
considered that the ‘leverage concept resulted from confusion about the exercise 
of market power’. Bork and Posner opposed the doctrine that vertical integration 
led to foreclosure. They claimed that a monopolist in the upstream market which 
can extract the entire monopoly profit from a competitive downstream market 
cannot obtain additional profits by extending its monopoly power. In the absence of 
efficiency gains, a vertical merger between an upstream monopolist and a 
downstream firm ‘cannot increase the profitability of the merging firms’. There is 
only a single source of monopoly profit, which is unrelated to the extension of 
market power to the downstream market. The only possible rationale of vertical 
mergers relates to efficiency grounds (the possibility of reducing production costs) 
and not to conduct related to the foreclosure of competitors on the downstream 
market.  
2.5. The European and the US doctrine and the practice of 
competition agencies differ on the effects of market power and 
on the evidence of anticompetitive conduct      
Contrary to the US, the doctrine underlying the practice of competition law in 
Europe has not yet experienced an in-depth critical review. For Marty and Pillot 
(2009), the European competition authorities are still significantly influenced by the 
ordo-liberal School, or Freiburg School founded in the 1930s. This school of 
thought regards unrestricted competition as a founding principle of public action, 
and posits that the fundamental role of public authorities should be to preserve 
competition in itself. Dominance is viewed as a stable and permanent situation 
which cannot be tackled by the market and which requires public intervention to be 
eliminated. The primary role of competition policy is to promote and preserve the 
access of dominant firms’ competitors to the market. Hence, the authorities’ 
assessment of market structures should prevail over their assessment of the 
economic effects of dominant firms’ behaviour. Marty (2010) asserts that the ordo-
liberal doctrine bans the concentration of economic power because such 
concentration prevents competitors’ entry. The purpose of European authorities, 
under the ordo-liberal influence is to preserve the competitive market structure 
rather than to promote a market structure that maximises efficiency. For Marty 
(2010), the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the ordo-liberal doctrine 
entails a degree of similarity with the structuralist approach of the US authorities 
before 1970 as both can lead public authorities to attempt to prevent dominant 
positions per se. Marty (2010) highlights that in the structuralist as well as in the 
European Court of Justice’s views, the public authorities’ duty is to prevent all 
dominant firms’ behaviour that could potentially foreclose competitors and limit 
their ability to grow.  
For Cooper et al. (2005), ‘Ordoliberalism tends to focus on the form, rather than the 
competitive effect of business relationships’. The European doctrine on competition 
law regards market power as self-perpetuating, and regards vertical relationships 
as prone to anticompetitive conduct. For example, vertical restraints such as 
exclusive dealing and exclusive supply contracts ‘necessarily foreclose competitors 
from contracting opportunities, and thus may be seen as perpetuating dominance’. 
In the context of persistent ordo-liberal influence, the European doctrine on vertical 
restrictions has recently shifted to an approach closer to the post-Chicago analysis, 
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as argued by Marty (2007) and Kovacic (2008a). The post-Chicago analysis, which 
developed in the early 1990s, has criticised the Chicago School’s view that vertical 
mergers are pro-competitive and that vertical integration generates efficiencies.  
According to Riordan and Salop (1995) the ‘post-Chicago’ approach considers that 
vertical mergers can have anticompetitive effects by ‘creating, enhancing, or 
facilitating the exercise of market power’, and that vertical mergers ‘can be 
motivated by monopoly power, economic efficiency concerns or both’. The post-
Chicago analysis on vertical integration differs from the Chicago School’s view 
because it considers that the upstream monopolist has a rationale for exercising its 
market power in the downstream market, otherwise downstream competition may 
limit its ability to exercise its upstream market power. Therefore, contrary to the 
Chicago School’s view, the rationale for a vertical merger might not always be 
related to the prospect of increasing efficiency.         
The European Commission (2015d) agrees with the view that dominance in the 
upstream market is likely to extend to the downstream market, reducing the 
incentives of downstream firms to innovate because ‘the rents which downstream 
firms can expect from efficiency improvements are likely to be partially captured by 
the suppliers of the intermediate inputs upstream’ and that ‘a lack of competition in 
the upstream market can generate entry barriers limiting competition downstream if 
access to downstream markets requires using intermediate inputs produced 
upstream’. 
For Kovacic (2008b), the European competition authorities have tended to ‘create 
a wider zone of liability for dominant firms than the decisions of the US courts’ and 
that ‘courts and enforcement agencies commit greater errors by intervening too 
much rather than too little. This perspective does not appear in EU jurisprudence or 
in speeches by EU enforcement officials’. This quote implies that, in the US 
perspective, overly restrictive antitrust enforcement would likely harm the economy 
because it could prevent efficiency gains from occurring. By contrast, in the 
European perspective, overly restrictive enforcement is to be preferred to an overly 
flexible approach because it is better to prevent anticompetitive behaviour from 
arising than to allow for potential efficiency gains to occur.         
In its Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, the Commission (2010b) outlines that the 
softening of competition (along with foreclosure and collusion) at the wholesale 
level (in the upstream market) harms consumers ‘by increasing the wholesale 
prices of the products, limiting the choice of products, lowering their quality or 
reducing the level of product innovation’. It might also harm consumers at the retail 
level ‘by increasing the retail prices of the products, limiting the choice of price-
service combinations and distribution formats, lowering the availability and quality 
of retail services and reducing the level of innovation of distribution’. By contrast, 
according to Marty and Pillot (2012), the US Supreme Court stated that for 
industries where there is an ex-ante regulation, such as network industries, the 
enforcement of antitrust to tackle market power of an upstream firm is not 
necessary: ‘when there exists a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy 
anticompetitive harm, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust 
enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws 
contemplate such additional scrutiny’. 
This difference in antitrust enforcement relates to the different doctrines adopted in 
the US and in the EU, where the post-Chicago approach recommends eliminating 
the effects of market power in upstream markets in order to prevent dominance 
being exercised in downstream markets, advocating a strict control of vertical 
restraints and vertical mergers. By contrast, the Chicago School does not 
recommend such strict antitrust enforcement, because market power is not viewed 
as a source of inefficiency and because vertical integration is viewed as a source 
of efficiency gains.        
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2.6. Market power (mark-ups on competitive price) is not 
regarded as economically inefficient by the US competition 
authorities    
For Shapiro (2011), the US antitrust law has ‘understood for a very long time that 
the market power resulting from successful innovation is an important and 
inevitable part of the competitive process’, and that the US merger policy does not 
strive for perfectly competitive market structures. Shapiro (2011) does not find any 
conflict between ‘competition policy principles and the Schumpeterian observation 
that successful innovators often are able to price well above marginal cost and 
often gain substantial market shares.’  
According to Marty and Pillot (2009), a core principle of US competition policy is 
the preservation of firms’ incentives to acquire market dominance. According to the 
US competition law, the exercise of market power is in the interest of the global 
economy. The authors argue that, contrary to the European approach, the US 
competition law does not strive to limit the strategic autonomy of the dominant firm. 
It considers that the purpose of competition law is not to affirm the specific 
responsibility of the dominant firm towards its competitors and the market structure. 
In this view, the dominant firm is not responsible for maintaining its competitors on 
the market. The dominant position is therefore a fair return on the capital invested. 
Market dominance provides incentives to invest in order to challenge the market 
power of the dominant firm.  
As noted by Newman (2014), the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice 
acknowledges that the social cost of false positive (i.e. wrongly sanctioning non-
anticompetitive behaviour) is higher than the false negative (i.e. failing to condemn 
real anticompetitive behaviour). This practice is justified by the belief that markets 
can efficiently correct ‘judicially unchecked anticompetitive behaviour’ while they 
are not able to ‘correct a judicial ruling that wrongly condemns benign behaviour’. 
In Verizon vs. Trinko (2004), the US Supreme Court stated that ‘the charging of 
monopoly prices was not a breach of the Sherman Act’ unless ‘it is accompanied 
by an element of anticompetitive conduct’, and that forcing the dominant firm to 
share the source of its competitive advantage with its competitors contradicts the 
purpose of antitrust policy. In the case of Blue Cross (1995), the Court of Appeals 
stated that a lawful monopolist ‘may charge any price that he wants, for the anti-
trust laws are not a price-control statue or a public-utility or a common-carrier rate-
regulation statue’. The case of Microsoft (2004) evidenced the differences between 
the US and the EU in the appraisal of market power. The €497 million fine imposed 
by the European Commission on Microsoft for abusing its dominant position has 
been criticised by US competition law practitioners and theorists alike. E.-M. Fox 
(2006) claimed that the decision limited the strategic autonomy of the dominant 
firm, and reflected ‘Europe’s principle of special responsibility of the dominant firm 
and the prohibition of using leverage and power to obtain advantages over rivals. 
These principles overshadow any freedom of the dominant firm to choose with 
whom and how to deal’. Moreover, T.O. Barnett (2007) opposed the European 
Commission’s decision, stating that ‘in the absence of demonstrable consumer 
harm, all firms, including dominant firms, are encouraged to compete vigorously’. 
Barnett (2007) outlines that the US competition authorities favour the strategic 
autonomy of dominant firms over maintaining competitive market structures: ‘US 
courts recognize the potential benefits to consumers when a firm, including a 
dominant firm, makes unilateral business decisions, for example to add features to 
its popular products or license its intellectual property to rivals, or to refuse to do 
so.’  
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2.7. The purpose of US competition law is to promote incentives 
to gain market power, whereas the purpose of the European 
competition law is to maintain ‘effective’ competition         
The US competition law does not ban the effects of market power and 
concentrated market structures as long as they do not result from unfair 
anticompetitive behaviour. Market power is not viewed as a barrier to entry as long 
as it results from a firm’s efforts to acquire and develop a competitive edge. The 
European competition authorities ban the effects of market power on the basis of 
the ordo-liberal doctrine. The influence of the post-Chicago approach induces 
European authorities to prevent market power leverage (i.e. the extension of 
upstream market power to the downstream market). The European competition 
authorities prevent dominant firms from deriving the full return on their investments 
because they consider that exercising market power is economically inefficient. 
The appraisal of market power by the European competition authorities might as a 
result hamper private incentives to invest. The European practice of competition 
law tends to limit the strategic autonomy of the dominant firms, because its 
objective is to promote the access of its competitors to the market rather than to 
maximise efficiency.  
3. The endogenous nature of innovation and its 
relationship with competition         
This third section builds on recent results from theoretical and empirical economics 
which call the European Commission’s doctrine into question. These results 
explain why a systematic increase in the level of static competition might 
discourage investment. Technological progress only occurs provided that firms 
respond to incentives to invest in new technologies and products, and these 
incentives depend on existing and expected levels of competition. There is a trade-
off between the level of competition and endogenous innovation, so that dynamic 
efficiencies hardly arise from static efficiency, especially in industries with high 
innovation rates.         
3.1. Technological progress is created by economic agents who 
respond to market incentives 
In the neoclassical framework, technological change is exogenous to the market. In 
the seminal model of Robert Solow (1956), technological change is a public input 
provided exogenously to the market. It is a non-rival and non-excludable good. 
Solow (1957) posits that growth is sustained in the long run by technological 
change, which only depends on the evolution of time. Paul Romer (1986) renders 
technological change endogenous: it is the outcome of private investment. Long-
term growth is sustained by the accumulation of knowledge, a process which 
occurs through the investment of private firms. Romer (1990) posits that 
technological change results in large part from ‘intentional actions taken by people 
who respond to market incentives’. Technological change occurs only if ‘self-
interested individuals’ can capture a sufficient benefit from their investment in the 
improvement of technology, whose benefits are ‘at least partially excludable’. 
Market incentives are crucial to technological progress because they drive the 
transformation of new knowledge into goods with practical value. Romer (1990) 
explains that ‘initial understanding of electromagnetism arose from research 
conducted in academic institutions, but magnetic tape and home videocassette 
recorders resulted from attempts by private firms to earn a profit’. To increase 
productivity, firms have to invest in capital goods which incorporate technological 
innovations. The driver of this investment is the prospect of earning a profit. This 
assertion implies that unless there is private investment in fixed assets, available 
innovations per se will not have any effect on productivity.   
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3.2. Firms invest in the production of technological innovation 
provided there exist sufficient expected reward, hence a 
sufficiently concentrated market structure 
For Romer (1990), the creation of innovations is equivalent to incurring a fixed 
cost, and once they are produced, they can be used at no additional cost. 
Technological innovations are partially excludable and non-rival goods. The costs 
incurred to produce new goods are recovered provided they are sold at a price 
higher than their marginal cost of production. Therefore, endogenous innovation 
cannot occur under price-taking competition. The investment in capital goods that 
embody innovations depends on the ability of investors to recover their investment. 
A certain degree of market power is needed for investments to occur, thus for 
technological progress to spread through society. Romer (1994) posits that 
endogenous growth theory has allowed economists to take account of two evident 
facts on innovation: the endogenous nature of technological progress and the 
existence of market power and monopoly rents stemming from innovations. As 
noted by Shapiro (2011), ‘we would not expect to see atomistic market structures 
in industries that have experienced significant technological progress, and we may 
see high levels of concentration in markets that have recently experienced 
significant innovation’. A notable policy implication of endogenous growth models is 
that imperfect competition is needed to support the accumulation of knowledge 
through discoveries and the spread of technological progress through investment 
in capital goods. Firms are incentivised to invest provided they expect temporary 
monopoly rents in the form of mark-ups over competitive prices or higher market 
shares. For these reasons, a policy only aiming to increase static efficiency would 
hardly succeed in providing firms with incentives to invest in new technologies and 
products.    
3.3. The relationship between competition and investment is 
non-linear in empirical literature   
‘Are we so sure that competition always favours innovation in developed 
countries?’ With this question, Aghion and Griffith (2005) underline the uncertain 
relationship between competition and economic growth. There is no clear evidence 
that greater competition necessarily fosters innovation. The relationship between 
competition and growth has remained an open question so far. To the question 
‘can one turn to economists for clear and definite views on this debate?’, the 
authors answer ‘no’ and claim ‘it is fair to say that economists still have a limited 
and sometimes contradictory understanding of (competition’s) economic effects 
and, in particular, of the relationship between competition and growth’.  
Empirical studies on cross-industry panels provide evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between competition and innovation. Aghion et al. (2005) show that 
the Schumpeterian effect dominates the escape from competition effect once 
competition exceeds its optimal level. They provide empirical evidence of an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation. Instead of 
indefinitely increasing with competition, the rate of technological progress 
decreases after competition exceeds an optimal threshold. Above this optimal 
threshold, competition hinders the reward from investment. Competition reduces 
the incentives for firms to invest in innovation ‘by reducing the rents that can be 
captured by a follower who succeeds in catching up with its rival by innovating’. An 
increase in the level of competition can foster innovation when firms have a same 
level of technology, according to the escape from competition effect. However, 
when the level of technology is unevenly distributed across firms, an increase in 
competition intensity will discourage laggard firms from investing in order to catch 
up with the leaders because it reduces the post-innovation rents. Following Aghion 
et al. (2005), Askenazy et al. (2008) evidence an inverted U-shape relationship 
between competition and R&D investment, finding that competition has weak 
European Journal of Government and Economics 5(1)  
 
19 
 
effects on investment in the production of innovations when their costs are 
relatively high. In sectors where innovation becomes too costly, policies to increase 
competition will unlikely induce firms to invest. This suggests ‘modulating 
competitive policies according to the state of the industry’.  
3.4. Recent results in microeconomics invalidate the single 
monotonic increasing relationship between competition and 
innovation   
Theoretical microeconomics provides insights that the relationship between 
competition and investment is ambiguous and depends largely on models and 
assumptions. For Belleflamme and Vergari (2010), ‘an intermediate form of 
competition may provide a higher incentive to innovate than the traditional polar 
cases (either monopoly or perfect competition)’. They show that optimal level of 
competition varies across sectors, in accordance with their specific characteristics, 
and find that ‘different industries are affected in qualitatively different ways by an 
increase in competition’. The profit incentive that motivates investment is 
maximised ‘depending on the characteristics of the industry of interest’. The profit 
incentives are maximised either ‘by a competitive firm (Arrow’s claim), by a 
monopoly (Schumpeter’s claim) or by an intermediate form of competition’. 
Schmutzler (2013) provides a general theoretical framework to analyse the effects 
of increasing competition on investment, and concludes that these effects are 
ambiguous and vary largely according to the initial levels of efficiency (the marginal 
costs) and the initial level of competition. The theoretical framework accounts for all 
types of relationships. Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) show that the relationship 
between competition and R&D investment depends on the theoretical framework. 
However, ongoing microeconomic research tends to show that the non-monotonic 
relationship between competition and investment in technology might be related to 
its innovation intensity. Houngbonon and Jeanjean (2014) develop a theoretical 
model of the relationship between competition and investment in technology, 
where technological progress is captured by the impact of innovation on the 
marginal cost of production. They show that the inverted U-shape relationship 
between the level of competition intensity and the investment in technology is more 
likely to occur when the rate of technological progress is high. Moreover, the higher 
the innovation potential, the higher the level of price-cost margin which maximises 
investment in innovation. 
3.5. Capital-intensive industries with high rate of innovation 
require a concentrated market structure (i.e. the existence of 
market power) to sustain their investment effort  
A recent literature has explored the link between market concentration, the level of 
competition and the rate of innovation. It suggests that too restrictive merger 
policies can hinder the rate of innovation. Ivaldi & McCullough (2010) examine the 
welfare effects of mergers that have occurred in the US railroad freight market, 
where consolidations have increased both market power and the efficiency of 
service providers. During 1978-2006, mergers reduced the number of providers, 
increased market concentration and brought efficiency gains. Productivity and 
efficiency gains have been largely transferred to consumers through lower prices 
and higher volumes. In the long run, ‘despite a dramatic degree of consolidation in 
the industry’, the initial decline in consumer welfare has been followed by a sharp 
continuous increase. Mergers have not harmed social welfare and have brought 
large efficiency gains.  
For Tilford (2008), in high-technology sectors like pharmaceuticals or ICT, large 
market shares do not always mean less competition as few firms often bear the 
bulk of investment costs. Market power is often temporary because firms are 
competing through investments in technology, which sustains a permanent process 
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of transition between dominant technologies. Tilford (2008) argues that if firms ‘are 
forced to share their intellectual property with competitors, or prevented from 
controlling the price at which their products and services are sold, there is a risk 
that they will innovate less’. For Shapiro (2011), ‘a highly successful innovator may 
come to dominate a market, in which case observing a high level of ex post 
concentration would hardly imply a lack of ex ante competition, or a lack of 
innovation’. Shapiro (2011) indicates that atomistic market structures should not be 
expected in industries where significant technological progress has occurred. On 
the contrary, highly concentrated market structures should normally occur in 
industries that have experienced significant innovations. Gans (2015) outlines that 
a permissive antitrust policy which makes mergers more likely to occur can 
promote competition in industries which have high innovation rate and where the 
returns on investment in technology are short-lived. The prospect of merging with 
highly innovative firms encourages entry and increases competition in innovation. 
Gans (2015) suggests that merger policies can have long-lasting effects on 
competition and the rate of innovation. Indeed, under a stronger antitrust 
enforcement, more potential mergers are likely to be blocked, which causes firms 
that ‘might otherwise have stayed in longer to find a merger partner’ to exit the 
industry. The market is thus deprived of R&D investment and innovations that 
those firms would have produced.  
This effect is investigated empirically by Igami and Uetake (2015) who show that 
the strengthening of merger policy in a highly innovative industry would not 
necessarily result in higher competition, innovation and welfare. They study the 
hard-disk drive global industry between 1976 and 2014, and provide evidence that 
a tighter merger policy can decrease firms’ value and increase the number of exits 
by liquidation. When the opportunities to merge with an innovative firm decrease, 
firms expect that productivity improvements and market power will decrease and 
thus choose to exit. A high rate of merger blocking in highly innovative industries 
could hinder competition and innovation by discouraging entry and encouraging 
exit.      
According to the OECD (2012), ‘there can be sectors or industries where 
innovation is greater when firms have the possibility to acquire a monopolist 
position, at least temporarily, and thus charge a price which is above marginal cost 
during such a period’. The OECD (2012) explains that in sectors with high rates of 
innovation such as the pharmaceutical industry, competition occurs mainly through 
‘races to innovate’ rather than through price setting, and ‘during the period of 
patent protection, firms are usually able to charge a supra-competitive price, which 
allows them to recoup the high costs incurred during the research and 
development stages’. Dynamic efficiencies, which are related to ‘the ability of a firm 
and its incentives to introduce new products or processes of production (or to 
improve existing ones)’, will hardly arise from a market where static efficiency is 
achieved, because in such market, prices would equal marginal costs of 
production.  
The OECD (2007) concludes that for this reason, the ‘textbook perfect competition 
may be inconsistent with dynamic efficiencies’. The capacity to set prices above 
the marginal costs of production is necessary for innovation to occur. For this 
reason, investment in new technologies and new products would not arise in 
markets where static efficiency is achieved. Overall, the results presented in this 
subsection support the view that investments in technologies and capital goods 
that incorporate technologies are likely to be discouraged when static competition 
is too high, and need either concentrated market structure or market power to 
occur.  
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3.6. Cross-country differences in growth rates stem from 
differences in the levels of investment in fixed assets which 
incorporate technologies        
From Romer (1990), it appears that productivity gains stem from the diffusion of 
capital goods which have incorporated new technologies through fixed assets 
investment. Cross-country differences in the rates of innovation diffusion through 
investment should then explain a large part of the cross-country differences in 
rates of productivity growth. Comin and Mestieri (2010) provide evidence that the 
diffusion of new technologies has a major role in explaining long-run international 
differences in per-capita income, and that these differences are mostly due to the 
cross-country differences in investment in the fixed assets that incorporate the new 
technologies. The authors study the contribution of technological change to the 
growth of aggregate productivity of 166 countries over the period 1820-2003. They 
posit that the adoption of new technologies by a country has two distinct 
components: the extensive margin of adoption, which captures the adoption lag, 
(how long it takes to adopt a new technology) and the intensive margin of adoption, 
which measures how many intermediary goods embodying the new technology are 
being used to produce the final goods. They estimate that the international 
differences in the adoption of technologies explain nearly 70 percent of the 
differences in countries’ per-capita income in the long run, and that the larger part 
of these differences can be attributed to differences in intensive margins of 
adoption, hence, in investment in intermediary goods that incorporate the new 
technologies.  
Van Ark et al. (2008) find that the contribution of ICT capital to the growth of 
aggregate labour productivity has been relatively higher than the contribution of 
labour and of non-ICT capital in either the EU (EU-10) or the US over 1980-2004. 
Moreover, the growth of labour productivity has slowed down since 1995 in the EU 
while it has significantly accelerated in the US, due to both higher levels of ICT 
investment and a faster diffusion of ICT assets in the market services sector. The 
authors underline that the main driving force of the growth of labour productivity in 
the US in the mid-1990s related to both a rise in the productivity of industries 
producing ICT equipment and a capital-deepening effect fuelled by investment in 
ICT assets by the other sectors of the economy. Van Welsum et al. (2013) confirm 
that the weaker labour productivity growth of the EU compared to the US has 
persisted after the mid-2000s and can be largely explained by a weaker impact of 
investment in ICT capital goods on labour and total factor productivity. The 
differences in aggregate labour productivity growth between the EU and the US are 
significantly related to differences in the levels of aggregate investment in ICT 
capital goods. These results show that the level of aggregate investment in fixed 
assets which incorporate digital technologies has a major impact on the rate of 
productivity growth of a country, and a large share of cross-country differences in 
the rates of productivity growth can be attributed to cross-country differences in the 
levels of such investment.  
4. The European and US doctrines in light of recent 
economic findings on competition and innovation     
Evidence presented in the three preceding sections outlines that the US 
competition policy appear more consistent with the recent advances in theoretical 
and empirical economics than the European doctrine and practice. The European 
competition authorities still regard market power as a source of inefficiency and 
consider that the effects of market power have to be removed because they harm 
the competitive process. This can lead the European authorities to sanction 
strategic behaviours that are in reality pro-competitive, hence taking the risk of 
depriving the economy from potential additional efficiency gains.   
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European competition policy rules out any possible trade-off between static 
efficiency and dynamic efficiencies. It strives to enhance static competition and  to 
remove the effects of market power. The views of the European competition 
authorities on market power are still strongly influenced by the ‘ordo-liberal’ 
doctrine, which considers that the main purpose of economic policy is to promote 
entry and to limit the possibility of the dominant firm to exert its market power. 
However, literature examined in the third section shows that investment in 
innovation will not arise from a market where static efficiency is achieved. Firms 
which cannot set prices above marginal costs will have neither the incentives nor 
the capabilities to invest in technology. A market where the level of static 
competition exceeds its optimal threshold will tend to decrease the rate of 
endogenous innovation. The European competition authorities, under the influence 
of the post-Chicago synthesis, tend to prevent efficiencies due to vertical 
integration from occurring. Indeed, they consider that vertical restraints are 
potentially anticompetitive and that vertical integration is more likely to allow the 
exercise of upstream market power than to generate efficiencies.  
By contrast, the U.S courts and competition agencies work to preserve market 
power and consider that upstream market power unlikely extends itself to the 
downstream markets. They consider that market power is a necessary incentive for 
firms to engage in risky investment and that supra-competitive profit is a normal 
return on investment. The US courts (since the adoption of the Chicago School’s 
views) ceased to consider competitive market structure as an objective per se, and 
focused on the promotion of efficiency. The higher rates of productivity growth 
achieved by the US during the last twenty years can to a large extent be attributed 
to higher levels of investment in ICT during this period. On the basis of the analysis 
of the U.S competition principles provided in the second section, it can be inferred 
that these levels of investment could have been favoured by the US doctrine on 
competition law. 
Under US competition law, the dominant firm has more strategic autonomy and the 
search for market power is promoted rather than discouraged by the US courts. In 
particular, the higher level of investment of ICT industries (which are network 
industries under an ex-ante regulation) in the US appears to be at least in part 
favoured by the doctrine of US competition agencies. Indeed, the US competition 
authorities promote market power, do not ban concentrated market structure per 
se, and are sceptical of the incentives of integrated firms to leverage market power.        
Conclusion 
The European Commission’s economic policy, which regards competition policy as 
the main engine of economic growth, builds upon its doctrine on competition law. 
This doctrine is influenced by a structuralist approach of market power and a post-
Chicagoan view on the assessment of vertical restraints. These approaches lead 
European authorities to favour non-concentrated market structures independently 
of economic efficiency. Besides, European policy strives to increase the level of 
static competition (i.e. lowering prices down to the marginal costs) because it 
considers that dynamic efficiencies (investment in technology) arise from static 
efficiency.          
This policy favours static over dynamic competition, and ignores the trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiencies. The European economic policy tends to 
limit the incentives and capacities to invest in new technologies and in fixed assets 
that incorporate those technologies. Such a policy hampers dynamic efficiencies by 
impeding expected profit margins which are needed to sustain current and future 
investments. On the contrary, US doctrine, under the influence of the Chicago 
School, has led US authorities to favour economic performance over maintaining 
non-concentrated market structure, to acknowledge market power has a legitimate 
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incentive and investment reward, and to avoid enforcing robust antitrust in 
regulated industries where vertical integration generates efficiencies. This doctrine 
might have led to a competition policy more likely to sustain investment  in the 
most productive and technologically advanced industries. Indeed, the higher levels 
of US ICT investment have contributed to higher growth, and the gap with the EU 
has begun to widen when ICT were being heavily adopted through high investment 
efforts. In light of these results, the European Commission’s economic doctrine 
needs a review in order to restore profitability, technological leadership and growth.     
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